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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to revisit the influential work of Mauro [1995] focus-
ing on the strength of his results under weak identification. He finds a negative
impact of corruption on investment and economic growth that appears to be robust
to endogeneity when using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Since the inception of
Mauro [1995], much literature has focused on 2SLS methods revealing the dan-
gers of estimation and thus inference under weak identification. We reproduce the
original results of Mauro [1995] with a high level of confidence and show that
the instrument used in the original work is in fact ’weak’ as defined by Staiger
and Stock [1997]. Thus we update the analysis using a test statistic robust to
weak instruments. Our results suggest that under Mauro’s original model there is
a high probability that the parameters of interest are locally almost unidentified
in multivariate specifications. To address this problem, we also investigate other
instruments commonly used in the corruption literature and obtain similar results.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to revisit Mauro (1995) and examine the validity
of his results as a consequence of recent research that cautions against making
inference in the presence of weak instruments. Early work done by Nelson and
Startz (1990b, 1990a) demonstrate that the distribution of the 2SLS estimator
and the t-statistic is poorly approximated by the asymptotic representation when
instruments are weak. Later, Staiger and Stock (1997) find that, in nonlinear
GMM, weak instruments correspond to weak identification of some or all of the
unknown parameters. They prove that, even in large samples, weak identification
leads to test statistics with non-normal distributions, thus making conventional
2SLS or GMM inferences misleading. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest a first-
stage F-statistic of 10 on the excluded instruments as an indication of acceptable
instruments. Further, Cruz and Moreira (2005) show that the finite sample bias
inherent in 2SLS estimator is exacerbated when using weak instruments. We
therefore attempt to reproduce Mauro’s results and analyze them in light of these
recent findings.
From the early work of Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) corruption in govern-
ment has been of great interest to economists. These studies argue that corruption
could be positively correlated with economic performance in the presence of a thick
and cumbersome bureaucracy. Corruption in this view “greases the wheels” of bu-
reaucracy, thus increasing the efficiency in which transactions occur, leading to a
positive effect on the economic performance of a country.
On the other hand Rose-Ackerman (1978), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991,
1993), and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) provide theoretical arguments that corrup-
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tion deteriorates economic growth through the misallocation of talent and other
resources.
Mauro (1995) contributes to this debate by examining empirically the relation-
ship between two measures of corruption and investment and economic growth.
His results suggest that corruption has a negative impact on investment and eco-
nomic growth. The significance of his results varies with model specifications
but the results appear to be robust when correcting for the potential endogeneity
of corruption. Using the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index as an in-
strumental variable (IV), he employs 2SLS estimation to correct for endogeneity
created by the two measures of corruption.
The impact of Mauro (1995)’s work can be gauged by looking at the numerous
citations the paper has received since it was published. According to one ranking,
the paper is among the top citeasnound papers in economics.1 This paper has had
a profound influence on the direction of research in corruption as well as policy
making. This requires us to examine it closely and ensure the validity of its results
using methods unavailable to researchers at the time.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our methodology includ-
ing the test statistic that is robust to weak identification. Section 3 we review the
data used in our analysis spending some time on the instrument used by Mauro
and another instrument commonly used in the corruption literature. We then
review our findings in section 4 and finally conclude.
1http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.item.nbciteasnouns.html
3
2 Methodology
Mauro (1995) follows a typical estimation procedure for cross-country analysis,
averaging investment share and per-capita GDP growth over 1960-1985. While
averaging across countries may seem inferior to a panel approach, recent work by
Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) finds that the averaging methodology performs best
in the presence of endogeneity or measurement error compared to fixed-effects,
random-effects, and Arellano-Bond estimators. Mauro (1995) uses the following
setup to examine the relationship between corruption and long-run investment and
growth of per-capita GDP :
y1 = Xβ0 + β1y2 + u where EX ′u = 0 and Ey′2u 6= 0 (1)
Here X is an n×K matrix of control variables often used in cross-country growth
regressions found in Barro (1991) or Levine and Renelt (1992). y1 is an n×1 vector
containing data on investment share or per-capita growth, and y2 is an n×1 vector
containing data on either corruption or bureaucratic efficiency. The reduced form
equation for y2 is:
y2 = Xδ0 + Z˜δ1 + v (2)
Z˜ is an n× k matrix of IVs s.t. EZ˜ ′u = 0 and cov(Z˜, y2) 6= 0.
When the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable
problems arise under 2SLS estimation. Under the assumption of normal errors,
Cruz and Moreira (2005) describe methods that lead to more reliable test statistics
and confidence intervals when confronted with weak identification.
We employ Cruz and Moreira (2005)’s conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test
4
statistic:2
CLR =
1
2
[
S¯′S¯ − T¯ ′T¯ +
√
[S¯′S¯ + T¯ T¯ ]2 − 4[S¯′S¯ · T¯ ′T¯ − (S¯′T¯ )2]
]
(3)
where:
S¯ = (b′Ωb · Z ′Z)−1/2Z ′Y b
T¯ = (a′Ω−1a · Z ′Z)−1/2Z ′Y Ω−1a
Y = [y1 y2]
b = [1 − βNULL]′
a = [βNULL 1]′
Z = (I −X(X ′X)−1X ′)Z˜
where Ω is the variance-covariance matrix to be estimated. The conditional na-
ture of the CLR test comes from the fact that the critical value is calculated via
simulations.3 Although there are other test statistics that are valid under weak
identification, Andrews et al. (2006) demonstrate that the CLR test has the cor-
rect null rejection probability when identification is weak and it dominates similar
test statistics, including the Lagrange multiplier (LM) and the Anderson-Rubin
(AR) statistics in power comparisons. Even though the assumption of normal er-
rors seems rather restrictive, Andrews et al. (2006) show that the power of the
CLR test can be unaffected even with nonnormal errors. Because the CLR test is
centered around the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator,
2See http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/moreira/softwaresimulations.html for
the CLR test code.
3For a detailed description of this process see Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2006).
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we report the LIML estimates in our results.
3 Data Description
The data we use derives from multiple sources including Summers and Heston
(1988), Barro (1991) and directly from Mauro (1995).4 The ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization (ELF), corruption and bureaucratic efficiency indices are from the
appendix of Mauro (1995). The original source of the ELF index is Taylor and
Hudson (1972). The data for legal origins (LO) is from the World Bank.5
Tables 1 through 4 show that our regressions match those of Mauro (1995)
very closely in size of the coefficients and significance levels in both univariate and
multivariate OLS. Since our data set seems to match the original data set well, we
feel comfortable extending our results to those found in Mauro (1995).
3.1 Instruments
The first instrument we examine, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index,
has the following form:
ELF = 1−
I∑
i=1
(ni
N
)2
(4)
where I is the number of ethnolinguistic groups in a country, ni is the number of
people in the ith group, and N is the total population of the country. Therefore,
the higher the index, the more fragmented the country. Mauro (1995) draws on
simple correlations between the ELF index, corruption, and bureaucratic efficiency
4These data constructed by Barro (1991) and Summers and Heston (1988) can be found
at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddlevren.htm
5http://econ.worldbank.org/
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arguing that greater fragmentation leads to higher levels of corruption as a result of
bureaucrats favoring their own ethnolinguistic group. The use of the ELF index as
an instrument for corruption is not limited to Mauro (1995) but has also been used
by Neeman, Paserman, and Simhon (2004), Dreher and Schneider (2006), Mocan
(2004) and Mauro (1996). The exogeneity of the ELF index is an assumption
made in Mauro (1995) and will not be addressed in this paper. The main focus
of the paper is to address the quality of the instrument in terms of its ability to
successfully identify the structural relationship corruption has with growth and
investment share.
Legal origins (LO) is another instrument commonly used for corruption as
found in Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), Dreher
and Schneider (2006), and Neeman et al. (2004). The papers argue strongly that
‘legal origins’ is a sufficient instrument for corruption offering the empirical results
of La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) as support. The vari-
able is a dummy indicating whether a country has French, English, Scandinavian,
or German legal origin. The justification for using LO as an instrument is its
relationship with institutional efficiency as well as with the level of government in-
tervention. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that more interventionist governments and
less efficient bureaucracies should have higher levels of corruption. For example,
countries founded on English common law focus less on government intervention
and place more emphasis on the protection of individual rights and should there-
fore have lower levels of corruption. La Porta et al. (1999) also argue that LO are
exogenous to economic variables because they are mainly determined by histori-
cal factors. We examine legal origins as a potential instrument for bureaucratic
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efficiency and corruption to offer an alternative to the ELF index. In our attempt
to find a strong instrument we construct religious and geographical indices using
a multitude of variable combinations. We create generated regressors and vari-
ous interactions of the variables listed in the appendix. However, after an intense
search we are unable to offer an instrument with sufficient strength that alters our
results.
4 Results
Table 5 shows the results under 2SLS compared to Mauro (1995)’s using both LO
and the ELF index as IVs. Once again, the results compare well in both the size of
the coefficients and significance levels. Table 5 shows that the first-stage F-stats on
the ELF index are 4.72 and 5.91, and 4.72 and 2.60 for LO. These are well below
the 10 needed to draw valid inferences as shown by Staiger and Stock (1997). Using
the methodology of Cruz and Moreira (2005), we create confidence intervals robust
to weak instruments using the CLR test in Equation 3 under βNULL = 0. The
results suggest that the findings in Mauro (1995) are valid under weak instruments
in the univariate 2SLS estimation. The 95% confidence intervals clearly exclude
zero, suggesting that both corruption and bureaucratic efficiency have a significant
impact on investment share under the model specifications presented in Table 5.
This is true using both the ELF index and LO as instruments.
Table 5 shows that the CLR confidence regions have similar lower bounds but
much larger upper bounds than the traditional Wald-type intervals reported. This
implies that it is possible for corruption and bureaucratic efficiency to have a much
larger impact on investment share than the mean effect reported in Mauro (1995).
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We report the J-stat for the overidentification restrictions on legal origins which
suggests the exogeneity of legal origins at very reasonable significance levels.
A word of caution however. With such small first-stage F-stats, the power of
the overidentfication restrictions test is questionable. Furthermore, according to
Cruz and Moreira (2005), weak instruments exacerbate the finite sample bias of
2SLS estimators. Thus, there could be substantial bias in the estimates in Table
5, especially if the ELF index is endogenous in the structural equation. This
point should be kept in mind throughout the analysis as it is relevant in both the
univariate and multivariate specifications.
Table 6 shows results from specifications including additional controls. Columns
1 and 4 show our attempt to replicate the results of Mauro (1995) using the ELF
index as an instrument. The coefficient on bureaucratic efficiency does not match
well, however the remaining coefficients are similar in magnitude and significance
levels, including the coefficient on corruption. Examining the first-stage F-statistic,
we see that both instruments are very weak. With a first-stage F-stat of 2.84 and
3 for the ELF index, and 0.62 and 0.04 for LO in the bureaucratic efficiency and
corruption regressions, respectively, we employ the CLR test to construct valid
confidence intervals robust to weak instruments.
The results are disconcerting as the intervals at the 95% level are unbounded us-
ing both IVs. This is consistent with the theoretical results of Dufour (1997), who
shows that under local almost unidentification (LAU), [e.g. weak instruments],
valid confidence intervals will be unbounded with at least probability (1 − α),
where (1 − α) represents the level of the confidence interval constructed. Dufour
(1997) also proves that, under LAU, confidence regions which are bounded with
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probability one, such as the Wald-type, will have zero coverage probability. Thus,
the probability that the true coefficient lies within the traditional Wald-type in-
tervals is zero. Moreover, in his later work, Dufour (2003, p.19) concludes that
“[u]nbounded sets are highly likely when the model is not identified, so they point
to lack of identification.” Nelson, Startz, and Zivot (1996) show analytically for
various test statistics valid to weak instruments, that unboundedness is a result
of near unidentification. They also show using Monte Carlo simulations that with
high levels of endogeneity and weak instruments the structural parameter is in fact
excluded from intervals created by inverted t-statistics as we have done in Table
6.
With such a low correlation between our measures of corruption and the instru-
ments, it is highly likely that parameters of the equation are unidentified. Since
we have reproduced Mauro (1995)’s results with a high level of confidence, one
should view the results of Mauro (1995) as uninformative.
Thus, if bureaucratic efficiency and corruption are in fact endogenous in the
specifications presented in Table 6, as Mauro (1995) suggests, then the estimation
procedure fails to identify the coefficients due to weakness of the ELF index. This
conclusion is also true when using the LO variable as an IV.
Table 7 shows the impact corruption has on long-run growth compared to
Mauro (1995). Using the ELF index as an instrument suggests that both cor-
ruption and bureaucratic efficiency are significant at the 5% level, as found in
the original paper. Neither bureaucratic efficiency nor corruption are statistically
significant when using LO as an instrument. Interestingly, the valid intervals con-
structed using the CLR test become unbounded for the coefficient on corruption
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in univariate growth regressions. Thus these intervals have correct size but offer
uninformative results.
We present the 2SLS multivariate growth regressions compared to Mauro
(1995)’s results in Table 8. The first-stage F-stats on the instruments are identical
to those in Table 6 as expected, so we report the confidence regions constructed
using the CLR test. We find unbounded confidence intervals for the coefficients
on bureaucratic efficiency and corruption when using the ELF index or LO as
IVs. The findings imply that, when using the ELF index and LO as instruments,
the effect of corruption and bureaucratic efficiency on growth cannot be identified
under the specifications presented in Table 8.
Again with such a low correlation between our measures of corruption and the
instruments, it is highly likely that parameters of the equation are unidentified.
Thus, making conclusions about corruption’s impact on per-capita growth based
on the results presented in Table 8 would be deceptive.
5 Conclusion
Our paper reexamines a key study in the corruption literature under weak
identification. We find that the instrument used by Mauro (1995), the ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization (ELF) index, is not useful in identifying the parameters of
interest in all multivariate 2SLS specifications. Using legal origins, an instrument
commonly used in empirical work on corruption, we show that our main results
do not change. Therefore, if corruption is endogenous in the multivariate regres-
sions presented in Mauro (1995), as the literature suggests, neither the ELF index
nor legal origins serve as valid instruments. Due to the widespread use of both
11
instruments in applied studies on corruption, caution should be exercised when
interpreting their results, unless proper techniques, as laid out in this paper, have
been used.
This paper serves as an example of the problematic nature of weak instruments
as first noted by Nelson and Startz (1990b, 1990a). Broadly speaking, empirical
researchers should always report the first-stage F-stat (on the the instrument(s))
to avoid making erroneous inference.
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Table 1: Investment on Corruption, Bureaucratic Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Investment/GDP (1960-1985 Average)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
SKJ Mauro SKJ Mauro
Independent Variables (2006) (1995) (2006) (1995)
Constant 0.059 0.059 0.087 0.086
[2.69] [2.74] [4.07] [4.14]
Bureaucratic 0.022 0.022
efficiency [7.34] [7.47]
Corruption 0.018 0.018
[6.32] [6.43]
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.40
N=58 N=58 N=58 N=58
Robust t-stats in brackets
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Table 2: Investment on Corruption, Bureaucratic Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Investment/GDP (1960-1985 Average)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
SKJ Mauro SKJ Mauro
Independent Variables (2006) (1995) (2006) (1995)
Constant 0.104 0.104 0.114 0.114
[2.89] [3.03] [3.04] [3.18]
GDP in 1960 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
[-1.25] [-1.31] [-0.61] [-0.81]
Secondary 0.06 0.06 0.111 0.111
education in 1960 [0.93] [0.97] [1.61] [1.68]
Population -1.373 -1.373 -0.62 -0.62
growth [-1.32] [-1.38] [-0.58] [-0.61]
Bureaucratic 0.019 0.019
efficiency [3.86] [4.04]
Corruption 0.013 0.013
[2.81] [2.94]
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.47
N=58 N=58 N=58 N=58
Robust t-stats in brackets
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Table 3: Growth on Corruption, Bureaucratic Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP growth (1960-1985 Average)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
SKJ Mauro SKJ Mauro
Independent Variables (2006) (1995) (2006) (1995)
Constant 0.05 0.05 0.012 0.012
[0.62] [0.63] [1.61] [1.63]
Bureaucratic 0.003 0.003
efficiency [2.53] [2.58]
Corruption 0.002 0.002
[1.93] [1.97]
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07
N=58 N=58 N=58 N=58
Robust t-stats in brackets
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Table 4: Growth on Corruption, Bureaucratic Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP growth (1960-1985 Average)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
SKJ Mauro SKJ Mauro
Independent Variables (2006) (1995) (2006) (1995)
Constant 0.010 0.012 0.017 0.019
[0.94] [1.26] [1.59] [1.86]
GDP in 1960 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007
[-4.74] [-4.87] [-3.77] [-3.88]
Secondary 0.011 0.011 0.031 0.031
education in 1960 [0.83] [0.81] [2.33] [2.40]
Population -0.571 -0.654 -0.341 -0.395
growth [-2.32] [-2.85] [-1.42] [-1.88]
Bureaucratic 0.006 0.006
efficiency [3.08] [3.09]
Corruption 0.003 0.003
[1.93] [1.91]
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.38 0.38 0.26 0.27
N=58 N=58 N=58 N=58
Robust t-stats in brackets
20
T
ab
le
5:
In
ve
st
m
en
t
on
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
,
B
u
re
au
cr
at
ic
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
In
ve
st
m
en
t/
G
D
P
(1
96
0-
19
85
A
ve
ra
ge
)
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]
[4
]
[5
]
[6
]
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
B
E
B
E
B
E
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
on
st
an
t
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
82
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
37
-0
.0
21
[-
0.
77
]
[-
0.
05
]
[-
0.
78
]
[-
0.
25
]
[-
0.
51
]
[-
0.
27
]
β
2
S
L
S
0.
04
2
0.
03
1
0.
04
3
0.
03
3
0.
03
5
0.
03
3
[2
.8
0]
[4
.1
7]
[2
.8
4]
[2
.8
6]
[3
.4
3]
[3
.0
4]
β
L
I
M
L
0.
04
2
0.
03
3
0.
03
3
0.
03
8
C
or
re
ct
ed
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
W
al
d
(9
5%
)
[0
.0
12
,
0.
07
3]
[0
.0
16
,
0.
04
5]
[0
.0
1,
0.
06
]
[0
.0
15
,
0.
05
6]
C
L
R
(9
5%
)
[0
.0
21
,
0.
28
8]
[0
.0
16
,
0.
06
6]
[0
.0
16
,
0.
12
]
[0
.0
19
,
0.
17
1]
In
st
ru
m
en
t
(s
)
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
J
-s
ta
t
3.
58
1
1.
90
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
16
7
0.
38
6
F
-s
ta
t
(fi
rs
t
st
ag
e)
4.
72
4.
72
5.
91
2.
60
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
21
T
ab
le
6:
In
ve
st
m
en
t
on
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
,
B
u
re
au
cr
at
ic
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
In
ve
st
m
en
t/
G
D
P
(1
96
0-
19
85
A
ve
ra
ge
)
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]
[4
]
[5
]
[6
]
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
B
E
B
E
B
E
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
on
st
an
t
0.
03
6
0.
01
7
0.
03
6
0.
03
9
-0
.1
9
0.
03
9
[0
.4
0]
[0
.1
6]
[0
.4
2]
[0
.4
2]
[0
.2
0]
[0
.4
0]
G
D
P
in
19
60
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
21
[-
1.
34
]
[-
1.
16
]
[-
1.
57
]
[-
1.
23
]
[-
0.
35
]
[-
1.
41
]
S
ec
on
d
ar
y
-0
.0
78
-0
.0
82
-0
.0
78
0.
01
7
0.
21
0.
01
7
ed
u
ca
ti
on
in
19
60
[-
0.
48
]
[-
0.
43
]
[-
0.
56
]
[0
.1
5]
[1
.0
5]
[0
.1
6]
P
op
u
la
ti
on
-2
.7
5
-2
.9
64
-2
.5
74
-1
.1
44
-2
.6
0
-1
.1
44
gr
ow
th
[-
1.
43
]
[-
1.
31
]
[-
1.
84
]
[-
0.
81
]
[-
0.
39
]
[-
1.
12
]
β
2
S
L
S
0.
04
4
0.
04
8
0.
00
4
0.
03
4
0.
09
4
0.
03
4
[1
.5
9]
[1
.3
8]
[1
.7
6]
[1
.5
0]
[0
.3
6]
[1
.5
6]
β
L
I
M
L
0.
04
4
0.
06
9
0.
03
4
0.
44
1
C
or
re
ct
ed
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
08
1
0.
36
1
0.
08
1
0.
29
5
W
al
d
(9
5%
)
[-
0.
01
1,
0.
1]
[-
0.
02
2,
0.
11
7]
[-
0.
01
2,
0.
08
]
[-
0.
43
,
0.
62
]
C
L
R
(9
5%
)
(−
∞
,
-0
.0
90
]∪
[-
0.
01
5,
∞
)
(−
∞
,
∞
)
(−
∞
,
-0
.1
26
]∪
[-
0.
00
8,
∞
)
(−
∞
,
∞
)
In
st
ru
m
en
t
(s
)
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
J
-s
ta
t
1.
03
7
1.
66
6
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
59
6
0.
43
5
F
-s
ta
t
(fi
rs
t
st
ag
e)
2.
84
0.
62
3.
00
0.
04
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
22
T
ab
le
7:
G
ro
w
th
on
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
,
B
u
re
au
cr
at
ic
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
P
er
C
ap
it
a
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
(1
96
0-
19
85
A
ve
ra
ge
)
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]
[4
]
[5
]
[6
]
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
B
E
B
E
B
E
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
on
st
an
t
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
34
[-
1.
34
]
[-
0.
30
]
[-
1.
53
]
[-
1.
16
]
[-
0.
43
]
[-
1.
33
]
β
2
S
L
S
0.
01
1
0.
00
4
0.
01
1
0.
00
8
0.
00
5
0.
00
8
[2
.0
5]
[1
.9
2]
[2
.3
3]
[2
.0
6]
[1
.7
2]
[2
.3
4]
β
L
I
M
L
0.
01
1
0.
00
5
0.
00
8
0.
00
7
C
or
re
ct
ed
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
00
3
0.
08
0.
00
3
0.
06
9
W
al
d
(9
5%
)
[0
.0
00
2,
0.
02
1]
[-
0.
00
02
,
0.
00
91
]
[0
.0
00
2,
0.
01
7]
[-
0.
00
08
,
0.
01
1]
C
L
R
(9
5%
)
[0
.0
04
,
0.
10
1]
[-
0.
00
1,
0.
01
5]
[0
.0
03
,
0.
04
3]
(−
∞
,
-0
.1
8]
∪[
-0
.0
01
,
∞
)
In
st
ru
m
en
t
(s
)
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
J
-s
ta
t
2.
23
5
2.
05
3
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
32
7
0.
35
8
F
-s
ta
t
(fi
rs
t
st
ag
e)
4.
72
4.
72
5.
91
2.
60
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
23
T
ab
le
8:
G
ro
w
th
on
C
or
ru
p
ti
on
,
B
u
re
au
cr
at
ic
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
P
er
C
ap
it
a
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
(1
96
0-
19
85
A
ve
ra
ge
)
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]
[4
]
[5
]
[6
]
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
S
K
J
S
K
J
M
au
ro
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
(2
00
6)
(2
00
6)
(1
99
5)
B
E
B
E
B
E
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
O
R
C
on
st
an
t
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
10
-0
.1
66
-0
.0
10
[-
0.
40
]
[-
0.
59
]
[-
0.
45
]
[-
0.
33
]
[-
0.
29
]
[-
0.
32
]
G
D
P
in
19
60
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
40
-0
.0
12
[-
1.
58
]
[-
2.
13
]
[-
2.
91
]
[-
2.
30
]
[-
0.
39
]
[-
2.
53
]
S
ec
on
d
ar
y
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
51
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
01
-0
.1
68
-0
.0
01
ed
u
ca
ti
on
in
19
60
[-
0.
65
]
[-
0.
76
]
[-
0.
71
]
[-
0.
03
]
[-
0.
27
]
[-
0.
03
]
P
op
u
la
ti
on
-1
.0
80
-1
.2
78
-1
.0
77
-0
.5
64
-1
.5
47
-0
.5
64
gr
ow
th
[-
1.
88
]
[-
1.
65
]
[-
2.
04
]
[-
1.
26
]
[-
0.
39
]
[-
1.
66
]
β
2
S
L
S
0.
01
4
0.
01
8
0.
01
4
0.
01
1
0.
05
3
0.
01
1
[1
.7
1]
[1
.5
0]
[1
.8
8]
[1
.5
0]
[0
.3
5]
[1
.4
9]
β
L
I
M
L
0.
01
4
0.
02
2
0.
01
1
0.
08
4
C
or
re
ct
ed
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
06
0.
19
0.
06
0.
17
W
al
d
(9
5%
)
[-
0.
00
2,
0.
03
1]
[-
0.
00
4,
0.
04
]
[-
0.
00
4,
0.
02
6]
[-
0.
25
,
0.
36
]
C
L
R
(9
5%
)
(−
∞
,
-0
.0
33
]∪
[-
0.
00
1,
∞
)
(−
∞
,
∞
)
(−
∞
,
-0
.0
5]
∪[
-0
.0
01
,
∞
)
(−
∞
,
∞
)
In
st
ru
m
en
t
(s
)
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
E
L
F
L
eg
al
O
ri
gi
n
s
E
L
F
J
-s
ta
t
2.
16
5
0.
26
6
P
-v
al
u
e
0.
33
9
0.
87
5
F
-s
ta
t
(fi
rs
t
st
ag
e)
2.
84
0.
62
3.
00
0.
04
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
N
=
57
24
Appendix: Investigated Instruments
Religion Geographical Other
Atheist Absolute latitude Malaria rates
Belief in heaven and hell Coastal area Admin. and supreme court judge tenure
Budhist Elevation Degree of professionalism of judges and lawyers
Catholic Land locked
Christian Mean temperature
Hindu Percent land area in geographical tropics
Jewish Percent of population in tropics
Muslim Polar coordinates
Religious pluralism Poportion of land withing a 100 Km of water
Settler mortality rates
Soil suitability
Subtropics
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